

Markscheme

November 2022

Global politics

Higher level and standard level

Paper 2

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The paper is marked using the generic markbands on the following page, and the paper specific markscheme that follows. The markscheme for this paper is the same for HL and SL.

Markbands for Paper 2

Marks	Level descriptor
0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The work does not reach a standard described by the descriptors below.
1–5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The response reveals limited understanding of the demands of the question. ● The response is poorly structured, or where there is a recognizable essay structure there is minimal focus on the task. ● There is little relevant knowledge, and examples are either lacking or not relevant. ● The response is mostly descriptive.
6–10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The response indicates some understanding of the demands of the question. ● There is some evidence of an attempt to structure the response. ● Some relevant knowledge is present, and some examples are mentioned but they are not developed or their relevance to arguments is not clear. ● The response demonstrates limited understanding of the key concepts of the course. ● There is limited justification of main points. ● Counterclaims, or different views on the question are not considered.
11–15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The demands of the question are understood and mostly addressed but the implications are not considered. ● There is a clear attempt to structure the response. ● The response is mostly based on relevant and accurate knowledge of global politics, and relevant examples are given and support arguments. ● The response demonstrates some understanding of the key concepts of the course. ● Many of the main points are justified and arguments are largely coherent. ● Some counterclaims, or different views on the question are considered.
16–20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The demands of the questions are understood and addressed, and most implications are considered. ● The response is well-structured. ● The response demonstrates relevant and accurate knowledge and understanding of global politics, and relevant examples are used in a way that strengthens arguments. ● The response demonstrates a good grasp of the key concepts of the course. ● All or nearly all of the main points are justified and arguments are coherent. ● Counterclaims, or different views on the question are explored.
21–25	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● A very well structured and balanced response that addresses the demands and implications of the question. ● Comprehensive knowledge and in-depth understanding of global politics is applied in the response consistently and effectively, with examples integrated. ● The response demonstrates a very good grasp of the key concepts of the course. ● All of the main points are justified. Arguments are clear, coherent and compelling. ● Counterclaims, or different views on the question are explored and evaluated.

The content listed indicates possible areas candidates might cover in their answers. They are **not** compulsory points. They are only a framework to help examiners in their assessment. Candidates may take a different approach, which if appropriate, should be rewarded. Examiners should not expect all of the points listed and should allow other valid points.

An understanding of, and an ability to work with, the key concepts of the course are particularly important in this paper. Whether or not the key concepts are explicitly mentioned in a question, students are expected to draw on their conceptual understanding of global politics and are invited to draw on any political concepts that are relevant to the arguments they put forward.

Power, sovereignty and international relations

1. Discuss the view that cooperation is more effective than a state's use of force in global politics.

Responses are likely to include a brief description of cooperation. They may explain cooperation between two or more states as their adjustment or change in behaviour to the real or anticipated preferences of others, through policy coordination (Robert Keohane). Candidates could argue that cooperation is likely to benefit all states, even if not equally and is thus encouraged as being more effective, rather than state's focus on use of force or hard power through measures such as military action or economic embargoes to achieve its objectives. They could also argue that even the use of force might require cooperation (collective security). Candidates should provide benchmarks of their perception of effectiveness such as achieving desired domestic (civil conflicts for example) or foreign policy goals or arguing that cooperation is more effective in the long-term. Candidates could also argue that cooperation is more effective in promoting a state's national interest as well as common interests of human security, peace, and development. Any other appropriate conceptualization or demonstration of 'effectiveness' should be acceptable. Some students may equate 'cooperation' with soft power. While the use of soft power might make cooperation easier, the two cannot be treated as being synonymous. Candidates could then proceed to argue to what extent they agree with the claim that cooperation is more effective than a state's use of force in global politics.

Arguments in favour of the claim that cooperation is more effective than a state's use of force in global politics may include:

- In an increasingly globalized world, cooperation is the norm and a key to both survival and development. States are not sole/unitary actors with absolute sovereignty. They are connected through political and social relationships.
- The unilateral use of force by a state is usually less effective and could be considered illegitimate and unlawful. This means that states who use force unilaterally might pay a price in terms of reputation and international isolation. Even if states use force with other states there are legal and moral or normative constraints on the use of force.
- Transnational issues such as environmental pollution and climate change are real challenges that require cross border action and cooperation rather than use of force. These problems cannot be necessarily addressed effectively through the use of force or hard power. Eg of such cooperation initiatives include Paris Climate Agreement (2016) and Cartagena Biosafety Protocol (2000).
- On the economic front, cross-border trade and investment between states is based on cooperation, making use and control of force by a state unilaterally or in conjunction with others detrimental to their common interests. Since military and economic relationships or issues are not detached from each other, states cannot use force on one hand and ensure economic cooperation on the other. Eg IGOs and regional organizations such as ASEAN, EU help facilitate such cooperation.

- The material and opportunity costs of using military force is much higher for states to achieve goals or settle conflicts/disputes as reflected in the fact that the number of inter-state conflicts has reduced. There are other platforms available for states in the form of formal intergovernmental organizations and informal forums such as the UN, ASEAN, G7 and European Union for discussion and deliberations.
- States can make use of soft power or persuasion, attraction or co-option/diplomacy/negotiation using communication and technological advances to achieve desired outcomes. There are also common ideas, perceptions and norms that are accepted in the world today that foster cooperation. The use of force is thus not necessarily required. Eg Iran US nuclear deal.
- At a national/domestic level, cooperation could be more effective than the use of force. Eg the Colombian conflict was eventually resolved through cooperation after decades of the use of force proved unsuccessful.

Arguments against the claim that cooperation is more effective than a state's use of force in global politics may include:

- States continue to be primary actors in global politics even despite increased cooperation in a globalized world. They are sovereign entities that focus on furthering their national interests even if it means resorting to the use of force. This could be using hard power (military force, cyber-attacks, sanctions) or the threat of the use of force (former President Trump's threats to North Korea and Iran).
- The world is still organized around state-centric security concerns. Despite all efforts to participate in cooperation mechanisms, states continue to amass military equipment and armaments. In sum, military force still plays a significant role in relations between states, and they still rely on and deploy enormous amounts of military power and control. For example, Russia's annexation of Crimea and its attack on Ukraine.
- Formal intergovernmental organizations and informal forums are not effective in ensuring cooperation and solving the issues and problems that states face. In fact, even their agenda might be set or manipulated by the more powerful states. In such a situation, states might be pushed to use force to protect their interests. For example, UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were not fully implemented.
- States need to use force to manage domestic and cross border threats and issues such as terrorism, organized crime and resistance movements that cannot be completely solved through cooperation and require use of force. Eg Mexico's ongoing 'war' against drug cartels.
- Not all issues or functions of the state lend themselves to a solution through cooperation. The use of hard power becomes critical in such situations. For instance, functions of the state such as maintaining the rule of law, ensuring taxes are paid, implementing laws, administrative procedures or rules as well as ensuring compliance with them requires some usage of force.
- Cooperation might be taking place due to the possible threat of use of force. In other words, it may be forced cooperation and thus not effective for the state upon which it is forced. Power is at play also in cooperative behaviour. Hence, cooperation might happen only because the use of force is always looming large.
- At the national/domestic level, cooperation does not always prove to be effective. For instance, in the case of the Sri Lankan civil war, the use of force was more effective in achieving desired results.

Responses should make some reference to specific examples of how cooperation is more effective than a state's use of force in global politics now. They could discuss how the European Union (EU) has emerged as the largest market making each of the member states more powerful as a grouping or cite examples of initiatives taken by the UN (such as the Montreal Protocol) on preventing climate change and need to cooperate to address it. On the other hand, candidates could cite examples of how the use of force is still considered important by states. For instance, the use of force by Russia

over Ukraine, US use of force in the Middle East and disputes in the South China Sea between China and some Southeast Asian states. Candidates might recognize that cooperation can also entail collective and coordinated use of force. They might also problematize the concept of cooperation that could be forced rather than voluntary.

Responses should include a conclusion on the degree to which the candidate agrees with the claim that cooperation is more effective than a state's use of force in global politics.

2. To what extent do you agree with the claim that the legitimacy of a state is challenged if it fails to protect the human rights of its citizens?

Responses are likely to include a brief description of state legitimacy and human rights. Candidates may explain the legitimacy of a state as it or its actions being commonly considered acceptable both at the domestic and international levels. Legitimacy provides the basis of all forms of governance and other ways of exercising power over others. In other words, it provides the basis for rule by consent rather than by coercion and requires the state to have the popular consent of its citizens to exercise political power over them. Human rights are basic claims and entitlements that one should be able to exercise simply by virtue of being a human being. Candidates could suggest that challenges to the legitimacy of a state result from a lack of ability or willingness to govern, e.g., fragile/failed states, and some authoritarian states. Such states may be unable to ensure domestic peace, order, or wellbeing of their citizens and may use force within their territory, eroding the human rights of citizens in different ways. Candidates could elaborate further on their interpretation of 'challenges' to legitimacy ranging from whether it means simply questioning a state's claims to legitimate authority to the complete loss of legitimacy such that a state no longer possesses the basis to govern. Candidates could then proceed to argue to what extent they agree with the claim that the legitimacy of a state is challenged if it fails to protect the human rights of its citizens.

Arguments in favour of the claim that the legitimacy of a state is challenged if it fails to protect the human rights of its citizens may include:

- Human rights are regarded as universal at a global level and should be guaranteed by every state – regardless of its political system or regime type (democratic or non-democratic). States derive their legitimacy from the protection of human rights of their citizens. For example, South Africa and Argentina have included sections of the UDHR in their constitutions.
- A sovereign state has a responsibility to ensure that all its citizens are taken care of, and their human rights safeguarded at a national level. This includes basic rights to life, food, water and shelter. This is done through designing laws and ensuring their implementation. Any state that is unable to do so no longer possesses the legitimacy to rule.
- A legitimate state is one that is perceived by citizens as the ultimate political authority. However, some of these states could be fragile or failed - those that are unable to manage smooth and effective governance. Such states could be facing a humanitarian crisis, eroding their legitimacy. For example, Libya, Iraq.
- In a globalized world with intergovernmental institutions, there is no absolute sovereignty. The UN has advocated for the notion of R2P (responsibility to protect) as the duty of the international community to step in where a state is unable to manage affairs within its borders, and shield citizens from genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. In other words, the R2P doctrine actually frames the protection of the population from gross violations of human rights as the primary responsibility of a sovereign state; when a state is unable or unwilling to do so, it loses its legitimacy. And the responsibility to protect falls now with the international community. For example, R2P Libya (2011), Kosovo (1999) and South Sudan.
- The socialisation of states means that even those states who abrogate their responsibility to protect human rights will still pay lip service to the concept. Human Rights have a normative value and in an interdependent, interconnected and globalized world, states are expected to at least

follow some basic norms based on human rights. This is imperative to an extent, in order to be recognized as a legitimate state actor in global politics.

- A state has questionable legitimacy if it is unable to secure human rights. Such states create problems that are never confined to within its own borders, but are likely to also impact on neighbouring countries, for example, through refugee crises. The state can also become a breeding ground for terror groups and can induce crimes. Thus, they pose a danger beyond their own borders, for example Syria.

Arguments against the claim that the legitimacy of a state is challenged if it fails to protect the human rights of its citizens may include:

- There are no set or clear measures of state legitimacy. People's conceptualization about what constitutes legitimate political authority is different in Western states and in non-Western states for instance. Besides, the legitimacy of a state need not be necessarily based on its human rights record. It could be based on several other variables including the level of economic development (eg China, Singapore), a strong and charismatic leadership (Malaysia, Vietnam), or military power (North Korea).
- Even those states that are the most egregious violators of human rights will still claim to be protecting and enforcing human rights. States are sovereign and can take decisions keeping in view their national interests and stability. They may sometimes prioritise one set of objectives over another. In some instances, human rights may need to be suspended in the service of a greater issue/problem; that is, while other states may perceive them as violating the human rights of citizens, the state in question may be trying to maintain its responsibility and role as a sovereign entity by enforcing law, order, and peace. For example, Russia's involvement in Chechnya.
- The universality of human rights is questionable. What constitutes human rights for one state might not be the same for another. In such cases, state legitimacy cannot be questioned as citizens may not question or perceive the situation as an erosion of their rights. For example, Singapore and their interpretation of rights is different from many Western states.
- States could have internal legitimacy but not external legitimacy eg Somaliland has internal legitimacy (by upholding human rights if its citizens) but not external, because it is still not recognized as a sovereign state.
- Questioning the legitimacy of states and resultant interventions in some cases that might follow could be imperialistic in intent. It is not clear who decides whether human rights have been violated and whether the legitimacy of a state should be questioned.
- The legitimacy of a state is challenged not only if it fails to protect the human rights of its citizens but is also dependent on its treatment of non-citizens or those perceived to be non-citizens, such as Rohingyas in Myanmar, migrants, and indigenous peoples.
- In instances of human rights violations due to problems such as natural disasters or other humanitarian crises the legitimacy of a state may not be challenged.

Responses should make some reference to specific examples of how the legitimacy of a state is challenged by its inability to protect the human rights of its citizens. Candidates could cite examples of how legitimacy of states such as Sudan (due to conflict, hunger, lack of access to water); South Sudan (civil war, atrocities and human rights violations, hunger, no infrastructure and atrocities against women); or Haiti (human rights violations in the past, also faced a political crisis) has come into question or been challenged due to perceived human rights violations. On the contrary, responses could cite examples of how different countries might have divergent views on human rights based on their cultural outlook. For instance, there is an African Charter of Human Rights and a Cairo Declaration of Human Rights that provide the framework of human rights in Africa and the Middle East respectively based on their cultural context. In such cases, their legitimacy cannot be measured using a universal conceptualization of human rights because the perception of rights is also different. Some could argue that such challenges to a state's legitimacy in the short run may actually strengthen legitimacy in the long run as they force a reckoning of sorts.

Responses should include a conclusion on the degree to which the candidate agrees with the claim that the legitimacy of a state is challenged if it fails to protect the human rights of its citizens.

Human rights

3. To what extent does cultural relativism always hinder the protection and enforcement of universal human rights?

Responses are likely to include a definition of human rights as basic claims and entitlements that, many argue, one should be able to exercise simply by virtue of being a human being. Candidates should also offer some understanding of the two opposing conceptual foundations underpinning this question - universalism and (cultural) relativism – and the degree to which human rights can be said to be culturally or individually determined. Candidates may identify how human rights are protected by legislation, e.g. national constitutions, as well as by international treaties such as the European Convention on Human Rights and/or international institutions like the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Candidates are likely to refer to specific human rights instruments, e.g., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the American Convention on Human Rights (1969), the African Charter on Human's and People's Rights (2005), ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (2012). Finally, candidates may note that the responsibility for enforcing human rights lies primarily with national governments operating unilaterally or in concert with other states, e.g. R2P.

Arguments in favour of the claim that cultural relativism always hinders the protection and enforcement of universal human rights may include:

- The Western origins of human rights and the incompatibility of its imposition in Asian and African societies can be argued to prove human rights should not and cannot be universally applicable, i.e., claims based on universal human rights can be viewed as a 'weapon of cultural hegemony'.
- Political and/or economic elites have defended discrimination and violence against women and minorities by referring to cultural relativism, e.g., the criminalization of sexual orientation or gender identity in some African states, the genocide of the Rohingyas by the Myanmar state, the torture and jailing of women activists in Saudi Arabia.
- Some rights may be subject to much greater cultural relativity than others thereby undermining the 'universality' of human rights, i.e., Article 16 of the UDHR mentions the right of free and full consent of intending spouses reflects not only a specific cultural interpretation of marriage, but one that is of relatively recent origin and no means universal today even in the West.
- Proponents of cultural relativism generally agree with human rights proponents that all cultures value human dignity but assert that non-Western societies do not use an individual rights approach to protect that dignity, thereby undermining a key element of universal human rights, e.g., the Asian values argument where leaders and academics in East and Southeast Asia pointed to an alternative, more authoritative standard of rights, stemming from Asian conservative cultural values.
- Cultural relativism argues that if societies have adequate internal systems for protecting their own members, 'universal' human rights instruments are unnecessary and irrelevant, e.g., the reliance on Sharia law in many Islamic states.

Arguments against the claim that cultural relativism always hinders the protection and enforcement of universal human rights may include:

- Universality is about human dignity, not about homogeneity and so regional expressions of universal human rights can often be located in local languages, traditions and human rights instruments, e.g., the Banjul Charter (2005) or the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (2012).
- At least some of the conflicts between cultural beliefs and universal human rights are illusory, many culturally based beliefs do not actually come into direct conflict with international human rights principles. For example, the Buddhist concept of well-being coincides with western liberal conceptions of human rights.
- There is a striking similarity in many of the basic values that most contemporary communities seek to protect through reference to human rights, i.e., life, social order, protection from arbitrary rule, prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment, the guarantee of a place in the life of the community, and access to an equitable share of the means of subsistence are central moral aspirations in nearly all cultures.
- arguments of cultural relativism are often cynically made by economic and political elites in an instrumental sense as a means of maintaining power, e.g., in Malawi, President Hastings Banda utilized ‘traditional courts’ in order to deal with political opponents outside of the regular legal system.
- Globalization has made a universal rights approach the standard for UN organizations such as UNESCO and the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, as well as for major agreements, e.g., the Beijing Declaration.

Responses should contain references to specific contemporary real-world examples. Arguments in favour of the claim could note that moral rules, including human rights, function within a moral community. The complete denial of national and subnational ethical autonomy and self-determination required for universal human rights to exist is dubious at best, e.g., the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights imposes an obligation on signatory states to ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women as stipulated in international declarations and conventions but Art. 17 of the same Charter notes that member states are also duty bound to protect and promote cultural and traditional values recognized by the community. Arguments against the claim may reference how some authentic traditional cultural practices and values have operated as an important check on abuses of arbitrary power, e.g., many African cultures have a tradition of constitutionality with major customary limits on rulers that parallel modern universal human rights as seen in the Basotho maxim that ‘A chief is a chief by the people.’ Finally, candidates may conclude that for human rights to be universal, it is crucial for them to be compatible with cultural differences; rights and culture can and should mutually constitute one another, e.g., many pivotal human rights treaties receive broad cross-cultural support – The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forces of Discrimination Against Women have 193 and 187 parties, respectively; therefore, the prompt itself may be problematic. This and any other valid approach or example should be evaluated positively.

Responses should include a conclusion on the degree to which the candidate agrees with the claim that cultural relativism always hinders the protection and enforcement of universal human rights.

4. “Only the most powerful states can shape the role played by human rights in global politics.” Discuss this view.

Responses are likely to include a definition of human rights as basic claims and entitlements that, many argue, one should be able to exercise simply by virtue of being a human being, which are inalienable and essential for living a life of dignity. Candidates should also demonstrate a clear understanding of the bases by which a state may be deemed ‘powerful’. This is likely to refer to the key concept of power with candidates identifying states as ‘powerful’ in terms of their ability to

exercise hard power, or, alternatively, soft power and even smart power. In any case, candidates should elaborate on how different conceptualizations of power might shape the role played by human rights in global politics.

Arguments in favour of the claim that only the most powerful states can shape the role played by human rights in global politics may include:

- As the most powerful actor in global politics, states are largely responsible for the nature and shape of international relations. It follows then that the most powerful states are the only ones that have the material capability to shape the role played by human rights in global politics, e.g., NATO's interventions in Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011).
- The material power of a state can trump normative pressures and external influences from a relatively less powerful actor, e.g., China's undermining of pressure from the EU for stronger human rights compliance.
- Most of the key foundational human rights instruments were created and promoted by the most powerful states, e.g., the UDHR, ICCPR and ICSCER.
- The most powerful and persuasive democracies coerce and cajole less powerful states into accepting international human rights obligations, e.g., the EU's Preferential Trading Agreements (PTA's) contain human rights provisions.
- Powerful Western states dominate global human rights discourses to the extent that local norms and sentiments from the Global South are systematically discarded, i.e., scholarly and policy debates usually focus on 'top-down', Western-oriented and universalizing approaches in an international system in which hierarchy and deep material inequalities enable certain states to undermine less powerful peers.
- When the most powerful states engage positively with the human rights system, it sets a compelling example and sends a moral message to the rest of the world. For example, the Palermo Protocol, which created human rights protections for the victims of trafficking, was largely driven by the US. Conversely, by lowering its own human rights standards following the 9/11 attacks, the US encouraged other governments to lower the standards of human rights around the world.

Arguments against the claim that only the most powerful states can shape the role played by human rights in global politics may include:

- Given the centrality of sovereignty in global politics it is not just powerful states that can shape the role played by human rights – all states can strategically invoke 'sovereignty' to deflect exogenous human rights criticisms and norms, e.g., the Philippine's regime under President Duterte has been openly critical of the human rights advocacy of the EU and UN while Hungary under Prime Minister Orban has challenged the EU's commitment to democracy, rule of law and human rights
- Globalization has seen the emergence of different forms and sites of power other than the state and so accountability for the shape and protection of human rights must consider non-state actors, e.g., MNCs can rival the material strength and influence of states while NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, help shape the normative terrain of human rights and so non-state actors may be more significant drivers of human rights discourses and practices in global politics.
- IGOs such as the UN and EU play a significant role in driving human rights discourses and practices by functioning as effective forums for state socialisation, i.e., a state's pattern of human rights compliance tends to converge with those of their peer IGO member countries.
- Rather than being shaped by states it is human rights that constrain the power of states as the most powerful actors in global politics, e.g., the R2P doctrine and the fact that even repressive, illiberal states such as North Korea and China pay lip-service to the concept of human rights/dignity.

- Rather than powerful states, natural disasters and calamities may do more to shape the role played by human rights as they may force political leaders to enact measures that hinder human rights, e.g., many states increased their surveillance powers as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic.
- Human rights interest groups and other NGOs having consultative status have been prominent in various UN human rights meetings and in other international forums, e.g., Article 71 of the UN Charter authorizes ECOSOC to consult with NGOs concerned with matters within ECOSOC competence.

Candidates should include reference to specific examples to support their evaluation of the claim in the question. Arguments in favour of the claim might reference broadly 'realist' perspectives on this issue highlighting how, historically, only powerful states or hegemonies have the concentrated power to impose human rights values on weaker ones. For example, one can argue that much of the explanation for the Inter-American human rights regime lies in the dominant power of the U.S. Realist theory is also often invoked as an explanation for the emergence of the European, UN, and American human rights regimes immediately following World War II. Arguments against the claim could note that the term 'most powerful' is problematic and needs to be unpacked further. For example, the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries are often celebrated as human rights champions even though they are not 'powerful' in a conventional sense. It may even be argued that they derive at least some of their soft power from their strong human rights credentials. Any other valid and relevant approaches and examples should be evaluated positively.

Responses should include a conclusion on the degree to which the candidate agrees with the claim that only the most powerful states can shape the role played by human rights in global politics.

Development

5. Examine the view that the meaning of development is contested because of the difficulties of measuring it.

Responses are likely to include a definition of development as well as examples of indicators, single and composite. An example of a composite measurement indicator commonly used is the Human Development Index (HDI), which is made up of three weighted single indicators: income per head, literacy and longevity. Reasons for the contested nature of development should be considered. Detailed explanations of national income accounting terms such as real GDP/GDP/GNI per capita are not required, but a general understanding of aggregates is appropriate.

Arguments in favour of the view that the meaning of development is contested because of the difficulty of measuring it may include:

- Development lacks a universal definition, so measurements chosen depend on the agendas and disciplines of those defining it. An economist or the World Bank/OECD might focus on ranking income per head, efficiency and living standards; an environmentalist or Greenpeace on measuring emissions and sustainability; a political scientist on democracy and equality etc.
- Contestability arises from data conflicts arising from different perspectives. For example, oil rich countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait or industrialised countries like the USA might have high average incomes implying advanced development but large inequalities mask significant deprivation and poverty revealed by other indicators.
- Development is a process with no clear end point. Different measurement indicators are relevant at different stages of the process. Early-stage measurement might focus on land reform, property rights, demography and the role of the state, while late-stage indicators might measure, for example, attainment in healthcare, education, gender equality or urban/rural welfare. Early-stage

indicators are more tangible than later hard-to-measure freedoms, and development as an umbrella concept to cover such evolutionary change becomes diffuse.

- The terminology of development can become value-laden (e.g. “underdeveloped,”) and subject to ideology as it evolves. Western developed countries devised methods to measure, depict and sell their progress to the developing world as a modernisation process, for example Rostow’s Stages of Growth. However non-western countries have achieved poverty alleviation and social justice based on other approaches. For example, Sen focuses on development as enhancing people’s capabilities and freedoms to pursue a life of good health, access to knowledge, control over environment and freedom from violence. This requires different, possibly normative forms of measurement which are not comparable, for example the Corruption Perception Index.
- The picture is incomplete: not all countries are equally able to bear the costs of measurement, leading to non-reporting and an incomplete picture for comparison. At the same time the reliability of some indicators is challenged, for example double counting and imputed values in GNP calculations. In early-stage development, subsistence farming is economically invisible, and in late-stage development wellbeing and social justice are challenging to measure.
- Most measures of development tend to focus on what countries produce and pay for. Environmental and social costs are not so easy to measure and tend to be overshadowed by output measures. The most developed countries are also the least sustainable: CO2 emissions for example have an unaccounted cost to the future of all countries. Because environmental costs are most likely to manifest in the future, their true value is obscure and contestable at present.

Arguments against the view that the meaning of development is contested because of the difficulty of measuring it may include:

- The meaning of development is contested not because of the difficulty of measuring it but because of other reasons. These might include politicians selecting indicators for political reasons, for example China claims developing country status to get preferential treatment from the World Trade Organisation despite being the world’s second largest economy.
- Another reason that the meaning of development is contested which is unrelated to the difficulty of measurement is lack of agreement over pathways to development and differences in ideology. For example, the USA followed a capitalist, market-led approach while China took a communist, state-directed approach, and both have evolved over time.
- Measuring development has become easier and less difficult because electronic data collection is quicker, international organisations such as UNDP and OECD have become formidable data collectors, and the multiplicity of indicators allows more cross-checking for accuracy. This allows NGOs and governments to respond immediately to natural disasters which threaten development such as typhoon Haiyan (Philippines, 2013) or the Boxing Day Tsunami (Indonesia, 2004).
- The emergence of composite indicators such as HDI (1990), Genuine Progress Indicator (2006), Happy Planet Index (2006) and the Corruption Perceptions Index (2007) facilitate broader and more holistic conclusions about the nature of development by combining single indicators using internationally agreed weightings. It can be argued that improved measurement helps to focus on the meaning of development.
- As the process of development proceeds towards the overcoming of “unfreedoms” such as lack of human rights, deprivation, ethnic discrimination, tyranny and corruption, it can be argued that measurement of physical outputs and economic growth is becoming less important to defining development. The abatement of barriers to freedom is becoming more important. Rwanda is an example of a country which has succeeded in both senses.

Responses may contain references to other valid indicators and examination of their significance in the measurement of development, e.g., access to safe water, doctors per thousand people and years of education. Some responses may take a modernisation approach, focusing on the transition from reliance on the primary sector towards industry and ultimately services. If so, examples of appropriate indicators and their helpfulness should be given at each stage, with mention of individual

countries on that path. Finally, responses may consider interconnectedness in development, noting the helpful prominence of the UN recommended 0.7% of GDP official aid donation level and the increasing ease of comparison between countries and over time.

Responses should include a conclusion on the degree to which the candidate agrees with the view that the meaning of development is contested because of the difficulty of measuring it.

6. Discuss the view that the role of state and non-state actors in achieving sustainable development is positive.

Candidates should provide a strong understanding of sustainable development and the key concepts associated with it, such as sustainability, interdependence and globalization. The phrase “the role of state and non-state actors” and the word “positive” will also need to be unpacked to focus the response. Awareness of political initiatives and events of relevance to sustainable development should also be shown, for example, the Brundtland Report, Montreal Protocol, Kyoto, Paris Agreement, 2019 Climate Action Summit, COP 26, etc. Responses should show how both state and non-state actors positively promote or fail to promote the achievement of sustainable development.

Arguments in favour of the view that the role of state and non-state actors in achieving sustainable development is positive may include:

- Environmental targets from IGOs, such as the SDGs have lifted sustainability up the global political agenda and put pressure on national leaderships to conform by signing up to treaties at increasingly high-profile international conferences, e.g., the 2019 UN Climate Action Summit.
- Leaders of countries directly threatened by climate change such as the Marshall Islands have raised awareness and issued carbon neutrality dates, gaining support and emulation from leaders worldwide.
- Green political parties have entered mainstream politics and become prominent enough to enter governing coalitions, for example in Finland, Austria, Ireland and in Germany, whose Green Party is the fourth biggest by membership.
- Activist movements have put increasing political pressure on governments. Extinction Rebellion and school strikes in 2019 showed that there is strength of opinion among the young, who are the most likely generation to be affected by climate change, exemplified by Greta Thunberg.
- Political leaders in developed countries have started to compete to set targets related to climate change, such as banning imports or sales of cars with internal combustion engines (over 20 countries have set dates), renewable energy generation (67 countries have set target percentages), and the European Green Deal target of no net admissions by 2050. This reflects a consensus belief in a change of direction in development.
- Younger generations favour sustainability and green policies most strongly and seem set to influence traditional political parties more strongly as they get older, especially if they address these issues. For example, US voters aged 18-29 motivated by climate change and environmental justice overwhelmingly supported the Democrats in the 2020 election.

Arguments against the view that the role of state and non-state actors in achieving sustainable development is positive may include:

- Sustainability has not succeeded in reaching the top of the political agenda because of more immediate claims on the attention (and budgets) of political leaderships, such as the global Covid-19 Pandemic, regional trade hostilities such as the trade war between US and China, and within Europe, Brexit.
- The rise of populist politics has shifted the focus towards nationalist policies rather than the international co-operation needed to achieve global sustainability targets, for example, the US

withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change Agreement (2017-21), and Brazil's assertion of sovereignty in the exploitation of the Amazon.

- Inequality operates against least developed countries (LDCs) at the global level, and poor communities have less of a voice within countries, even though threats such as climate change tend to bear most heavily on the poor and those with least political influence. For example, Covid vaccination from 2020 went first to rich countries and later to poor countries suppressing development potential. In Brazil, indigenous communities without a voice are displaced by logging. This type of developmental inequality can be ignored by political elites.
- Powerful and durable vested interests such as multinational corporations (MNCs) continue to support unsustainable development in industries such as oil (a global oligopoly which includes the OPEC cartel), mining and agriculture. Their size and wealth may support political lobbying and contribute to traditional political parties which have been slow to adopt sustainable and green policies, e.g., the US Republican Party.
- Timing is unhelpful. Leadership turnover in democracies is fast, relative to climate change and the rise and fall of industries. Targets may be set conveniently distant in the future, for successors to deal with. While current leaders can argue that immediate support for climate action is limited. For example, 184 countries have issued pledges for 2030 and 75% of them are currently insufficient.
- Sustainable development is expensive, so it is easier for rich countries to adopt it than poor countries, who need funding and technical support promised by the rich countries to support the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. These financial flows have been falling since 2017, and now fewer than 5 of the donor countries reach the long-standing official aid target of 0.7% of National Income.

Responses should contain references to specific examples. For example, renewable energy targets might be given for a particular country (such as Australia 50% by 2030, EU 32-35% by 2030, China 50% by 2050) or ending of oil fueled car sales (Japan 2035, Canada 2040). Significant events might be signposted such as Kyoto, COP26 in November 2021. Responses should also distinguish between state and non-state actors and actions with examples of both. State actors promoting development might include governmental aid agencies such as USAID, Germany's KfW and Global Affairs Canada. Non-state actors might include international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Habitat for Humanity, Wateraid and microfinance charities.

Responses should include a conclusion on the degree to which the candidate agrees with the view that the role of state and non-state actors in achieving sustainable development is positive.

Peace and conflict

7. Examine the claim that non-violent methods are likely to promote justice for communities.

Responses should include a consideration of the merits or otherwise of non-violent methods in promoting justice for communities. Candidates should demonstrate an understanding of the key terms: violence, non-violence and justice, possibly by defining them. While violence is often defined as physical or psychological force afflicted upon another, non-violence is the practice of advocating one's own or others' rights without physically or psychologically harming the opponent. The concept of justice allows for a number of different interpretations, and it can be associated with a range of ideas (e.g., rights; fairness; capability approach). Justice is often closely associated with the idea of fairness and with individuals getting what they deserve, although what is meant by 'deserve' is also contested. The promotion of justice for communities can be understood both as raising public awareness and advancing specific outcomes.

Arguments in favour of the claim that non-violent methods are likely to promote justice for communities may include:

- Non-violent protests and movements with sufficient popular support very often succeeded in bringing about radical change and promoting justice (e.g., Rose Revolution 2003, Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia 2010-2011, Omar-Al Bashir's resignation in 2019, Bouteflika's resignation in 2019).
- Non-violent methods can lead to conflict de-escalation, providing a fertile basis for post-conflict transformation (e.g., South Africa).
- In the long-term, justice is promoted as a result of non-violent struggles that have raised awareness about specific injustices, inspiring and empowering people (e.g., Mother of the Plaza de Mayo, civil rights movement in the US, Black Lives Matter, Me Too movement, Fridays for Future).
- Justice is not normally assumed to derive from violence. The use of violent methods is likely to result in unjust consequences, exacerbating conflicts and preventing the formation of peaceful and long-lasting social relations, which are key elements in the promotion or realisation of justice (e.g., Kosovo-Serbia).
- Unlike violent methods, non-violent methods rarely lead to increased injustice. In the long-term, there is less collateral damage as a result of non-violent methods, making it easier for communities to heal even if they do not agree on issues (e.g., Catalonia).

Arguments against the claim that non-violent methods are likely to promote justice for communities may include:

- Non-violent protests often shift to armed resistance in the wake of violent repression. This can happen unexpectedly on the part of the protesters. Emotional reactions, availability of weapons and previous experience or training can all play a role in determining the adoption of violent methods (e.g., Syria, Ukraine, Arab Spring).
- Non-violence only makes it easier for those in power to prevent others getting what they deserve. Those in power can easily silence or repress non-violent protests (e.g., Hong Kong protests repressed by China).
- Even when non-violent methods are successful in raising awareness about specific injustices, they rarely lead to "real change" because of a lack of leadership or clear political agenda (e.g., Occupy Wall Street; the failed uprising in Bahrain in 2011).
- History shows that under certain circumstances justice is more effectively promoted through violent methods such as armed revolutions and rebellions (e.g., anti-fascist resistance movements, Zapatista Army of National Liberation).
- Non-violent methods for promoting justice through international courts are often ineffective because there is no clear mechanism to enforce decisions (e.g., International Court of Justice, International Criminal Court).

Responses should contain references to specific examples. Candidates could cite cases of non-violent movements, protests or campaigns that have been successful or otherwise in promoting justice for a community. The community in question might be a local, national or transnational one; while the promotion of justice might be identified with the achievement of specific political goals and a degree of change. When arguing against the view that non-violent methods are likely to promote justice, candidates could also cite cases where violent methods have proved to be effective in promoting justice. Candidates might recognise that justice is a contested concept and elaborate on cases that are evidence of this (e.g., 2021 Capitol Hill Protests). They may also suggest that the promotion of justice is difficult to assess.

Responses should include the candidate's conclusion on whether or not non-violent methods are likely to promote justice for communities.

8. “Lasting peace is unlikely to be achieved without development.” Discuss this view.

Candidates should demonstrate an understanding of lasting peace and its connection to development. Lasting peace tends to emphasise the importance of addressing the underlying causes of conflict and violence to eliminate recurring conflicts and build a foundation for a stable peace. As such, it is closely related to the concept of development, which candidates are likely to define as a sustained increase in the standard of living and well-being of a level of social organization. Candidates may focus on different levels of social organization (from the global to the community level) and may also acknowledge that development is a contested and multidimensional concept. Responses are likely to include a definition of the main concept of peace, both in its positive and negative conceptions. While negative peace is defined as simply the absence of war or of direct physical violence, positive peace is defined as the presence of attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies.

Arguments in favour of the view that lasting peace is unlikely to be achieved without development may include:

- A broad approach to development, one that focuses on justice, human rights, inequalities and inclusivity increases the possibility of achieving lasting peace. The UN’s 2030 Agenda that contains the SDGs and the Resolutions on the UN’s peacebuilding architecture recognizes that development and peace are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. While a peace dimension is found across the SDGs as a whole, Goal 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) explicitly highlights the link between peace and development.
- There is a clear link between lasting peace and development, particularly with respect to intra-state conflict. As societies develop, the incentive for lasting peace grows. Factors like greater food and water security, economic growth and higher income levels are all possible enablers of lasting peace (e.g., Botswana).
- There is a clear link between lasting peace and development, particularly with respect to inter-state conflict. Development creates more incentives for stable economic and political cooperation among states, thus reducing the likelihood of recurring conflict and building the foundation for stable peace. For example, the African Union was created in 2002 to advance the development of the continent by setting up new institutions and mechanisms for preventing and managing conflict. Another example might be the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
- Foreign direct investments in developing and post-conflict countries can lead to lasting peace in those societies. In Zambia, for example, foreign direct investments have contributed towards the development of the country and helped entrench peace.
- Inclusive development is more likely to steer societies towards a lasting peace because progress is sufficiently widespread for the majority of the population to benefit. Factors like democratic participation, gender equality, inclusion of minorities, equality of opportunities, healthcare and education are all possible enablers of lasting peace (e.g., Switzerland, Canada, Botswana).

Arguments against the view that lasting peace is unlikely to be achieved without development may include:

- There is no clear link between lasting peace and development. Some of the least developed countries rank highly in the Global Peace Index (e.g., Bhutan, Mauritius, Malawi).
- Lasting peace is hindered if the benefits from development are not fairly distributed among the population, in which case conflict and social unrest are more likely outcomes than lasting peace (e.g., Southern Thailand, Niger Delta).
- The proceeds of development might be channeled into military spending that will encourage conflict rather than enable lasting peace (e.g., Saudi Arabia).
- Development is a process that entails significant social changes at the national and international level. Domestically, it might lead to the disruption of the social order and inhibit lasting peace. Internationally, it might alter the balance of power that previously existed and enhance inter-state conflict (e.g., the rise of China and the South China Sea dispute).

- Development might require the exploitation of natural resources that involve the dispossession and displacement of local indigenous groups. This, in turn, engenders conflict and compromises the possibilities of a lasting peace (e.g., Brazil and the Amazon Forest).
- Development in the developed countries can actually lead to conflict in developing ones. The high standards of living in developed countries are fueled by cheap labour and resources primarily found in less developed countries. For example, the production, extraction and export of cobalt is a source of conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Responses should contain references to specific examples. As examples of how lasting peace is unlikely to be achieved without development, candidates could cite countries such as Botswana, Switzerland or Canada. As examples against this claim, candidates could refer to cases where lasting peace has been achieved without development (e.g., Bhutan, Malawi) or to cases where development does not promote lasting peace (e.g., Congo, Niger Delta). Any other relevant example should be evaluated positively. Candidates who elaborate on the idea of lasting peace should also be rewarded. They might suggest that the idea of lasting peace is intimately connected to the concepts of positive peace and development. Alternatively, they could suggest that lasting peace is a utopian ideal that is unlikely to be achieved under any circumstance.

Responses should include a conclusion on the degree to which the candidate believes that lasting peace is unlikely to be achieved without development.